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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

- - - - - - - - -

- -

LOIS JENSEN EDWARDS I
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
MELVIN LEROY EDWARDS,

Case No.

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Melvin LeRoy Edwards,
appeals from the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District's order finding the appellant in contempt of court and sentencing the
appellant to ten days in the Utah County jail,
ana said court's order denying appellant's

2

petition for change of support and alimony
provisions of the parties• divorce decree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court found the appellant
guilty of contempt and denied his petition
requesting lowering of child support and
alimony payments.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant submits that the District
Court's order should be reversed and his
petition granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about December, 1967, the respondent filed her complaint in the District
Court of Utah County, State of Utah, asking
for a divorce from the defendant-appellant.
On the 10th day of May, 1968, the District
Court made its order, which in part awarded
judgment against the appellant in the amount
of $870.00 for delinquent alimony and support
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payments; ordered the defendant to convey
all his interest to the parties' home to
Paul W. Shaffer, the respondent's son by a
prior marriage; ordered the defendant-appellant to pay $280.00 as child support and
alimony, said sum to be paid on the last of
June, and each and every month thereafter.
On August 5, 1968, the appellant filed
bankruptcy in the Federal District Court,
District of Utah.
On the 21st day of October, 1968, the
Utah County District Court entered its Decree
of Divorce which in part:
(1)

Granted the plaintiff-respon-

dent a divorce from the defendant-appellant.
(2)

Granted the plaintiff-respon-

dent custody of the parties' three minor
children.
(3)

Granted the plaintiff-respon-

dent all the parties' personal property.
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(4)

Ordered the defendant-appel-

lant to pay $60.00 per child per month child
support and $100.00 per month alimony for a
total monthly payment of $280.00.
(5)

Ordered the defendant-appel-

lant to save the plaintiff-respondent harmless
from liability of all debts of the parties.
On January 22, 1969, the Utah County District Court ordered the appellant to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt for
failure to keep his child support and alimony
payments current and his failure to hold the
respondent harmless from all the parties'
debts.
On or about the 11th day of February,
1969, the appellant filed his petition
requesting the District Court to:
(1)

Lower the child support from

$180.00 per month to $150.00 per month.
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(2)

Release him from any obliga-

tion to pay any alimony.
(3)

Give him custody of the parties'

children for three months out of each year.
(4)

Release him from any obliga-

tion to pay the parties' debts acquired
during their marriage.
On the 15th day of April, 1969, the
Court heard the above-mentioned appellant's
petition and respondent's order to show cause.
On the 2nd day of May, 1969, the Utah
County District Court made its order which:
(1)

Ordered the defendant-appel-

lant in contempt of court and sentenced him
to ten days in the Utah County jail; stated
that he could purge himself of the contempt
finding by securing a release of the lien
upon furniture in plaintiff's possession.
(2)

Denied defendant's petition

for change in support and alimony provisions
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of the divorce decree.
(3)

Awarded plaintiff judgment

against the defendant for $75.00 in attorneys
fees.
On the 15th day of April, 1969, it was
agreed in open court by the attorneys for

the respondent and appeiiant that the appeiiant was $4B0.66 in arrears for back aiimony
and child support, and that the appeilant
had paid $3,166.66 to the respondent since

May, 1968, to

April, 1969,

for

chiid support

and alimony, hot including April,
Further,

on

1969 (T. 17).

the hearing heid Gn April 15,

1969, appeiiant testified, and no testimony

or

other evidence was given to contradict

his testimony, that he had paid or incurred
monthly debts sihce the date of the divorce
decree approximately as follows:

of

(1) T. 18
residence

Gas for

is.oo
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(2) T. 19 Telephone
bill used in business
(3) T. 19
place of residence

$ 20.00

Light for

12.00

(4) T. 20 Second-hand
washing machine payment

15.00

(5) T. 20
on 1958 Plymouth

14.00

Car payment

(6) T. 21 Utah Central
Credit Union to pay back money, part
of which was borrowed to pay child
support or alimony
24.00
( 7) T. 23 Gas and oil
for car used to go to work
T. 23

Clothing

(9)
T. 23
place of residence

Rent for

(8)

30.00
15.00
45.00

(10)

T. 24

Attorney fees

30.00 app.

(11)

T. 24

Car repair

30.00

(12) T. 23 Food at home
and on the road while driving truck
for Pacific Intermountain Express
120.00
TOTAL OF ABOVE
MONTHLY BILLS

$374.00

At the above-mentioned hearing,

it was
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agreed that the appellant owed the following
obligations ( T. 26, 27) :
(1)
attorney fees

T.

25

Tom Taylor,

$103.00

(2)
T. 25 Lavoy o.
Taylor, attorney for bankruptcy
Court
Credit
Finance

(3)

250.00

T. 26

Bankruptcy

T. 26

Utah Central

(5)

T. 26

Fidelity

(6)

T. 26

Internal

(7)

T. 26

Back support

( 4)

Revenue Service

110.00
318.00
412.00
149.00
480.00

(8)
T. 26 Plaintiffrespondent' s attorney fees

200.00

TOTAL STIPULATED DEBTS
OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

$2222.00

At the above-mentioned hearing, the
appellant testified that he would like to
pay $50.00 a month on the above obligations,
Which are beyond his regular monthly bills.
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Thus, the record shows the appellant's
financial status is as follows:
INCOME
Average income per month
since date of divorce decree

$545.00

EXPENSES
Average monthly bills and
living expenses

374.00

Amount appellant would like
to pay on obligations other
than monthly bills

50.00

Total monthly expenses

$424.00

MONTHLY INCOME
MONTHLY EXPENSES

$545.00
424.00

AMOUNT LEFT OVER TO
PAY SUPPORT AND ALIMONY
(T. 28)

$121.00

Court ordered support
and alimony of

$280.00

The appellant was for the six months
preceding the date of the divorce decree
oarning approximately $650.00 per month takehome pay (T. 30), and since the divorce, has
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earned approximately $500.00 per month takehome pay (T. 27), at his place of employment,.
Pacific Intermountain Express, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
The appellant's income has dropped in
the last year due to the fact the respondent
has garnisheed his wages (T. 55), and the
fact that he has not had the necessary ready
cash to make long trips for said employer,
or the money to pay for his meals or rooms
on such trips (T. 31); and in fact, on some
trips,

the appellant has not had enough money

to buy anything to eat or to pay for a place
to sleep (T. 34).
At the time the divorce decree was
entered in this action, the respondent was
not working (T. 51); at the time of the
hearing in April,· 1969, the respondent had
been working for about two months at the Utah
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State Hospital, earning $199.00 take-home
pay (T. 52).

The respondent admitted that she had
been told by the appellant that he would be
fired from his job if she garnisheed his
wages, but she did garnishee his wages anyway,
and she implied or admitted that if he did
not make his full payments of $280.00 child
support and alimony, she didn't care if he
lost his job (T. 56).

12
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
APPELLANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT.
The appellant has paid $3,160.00 to the
respondent for alimony and child support since
May, 1968, to April, 1969 (T. 17).

Further,

the record of the contempt proceeding is
replete with evidence indicating that, through
no fault of his own,

the appellant cannot

afford to pay the amount specified in the decree
for child support and alimony.

The appellant

has met his burden of showing his inability
to pay.

DeYonge v. DeYonge, 103 Utah 410,

135 P.2d 905 (1943).
lant in contempt,

In order to hold appel-

it must be shown that he

was either able to pay or willfully refused
to comply with the order of the court.
absence of such a finding,

In

the order is void.

Jd. at 413, 135 P.2d at 906.

Appellant had

13
made his best efforts to pay

(T. 17), but

is presently unable to do so (T. 18-26) .

l\ppellant further argues that under the evidence,

it is conclusively shown that in spite

of his best efforts at all times,

he was

unable to comply with the court's order to
pay $280.00 per month to his wife.

v. Limb,

In Limb

113 Utah 385, 195 P.2d 263 (1948),

the court states:
If appellant is correct as to
the effect of his testimony,
then he was not guilty of contempt for a person who puts
forth every reasonable effort
to comply with a court order
and still is unable to do so,
is not guilty of contempt on
account of such failure. Id.
at 389, 195 P.2d at 265.
The appellant testified that his average
take-home pay is $ 500. 00 since the divorce
decree

(T. 27, 49) .

His average monthly bills

unci expenses are $ 3 74. 00

(T. 18-26) .

Appel-

l 0 nt would like to pay $50.00 per rnonth toward
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the $2,222.00 debt which he owes

(T. 27-28).

This leaves the amount of $76.00 a month to
pay the $280.00 that was decreed (T. 28).
This is ample evidence of his inability to
pay.

And in light of the fact that he has

put forth every reasonable effort to comply
with the order,

the appellant should be able

to purge himself of contempt.

in Wallis v. Wallis,
103 (1959)

said

11

As the court

9 Utah 2d 237,

•••

because his failure to

pay the $100 had not been wilful,
in contempt. Id. at 239,

11

he was not

342 P.2d at 104.

These two requirements,
to pay and ( 2)

342 P.2d

i.e.,

(1)

inability

reasonable effort to pay, have

been established in this case.
has met his burden.

The appellant

The trial court erred in

finding him in contempt.
lo comply is not con tempt.

A reasonable effort
Ozmus v. Ozmus,

114 Utah 216, 222, 198 P.2d 233, 236 (1948).
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN COM..MITTING THE APPELLANT TO JAIL FOR TEN
DAYS UNLESS HE SECURE A RELEASE OF A LIEN
UPON FURNITURE IN RESPONDENT'S POSSESSION.
A judgment for contempt for failure to
comply with an alimony and support order must
be based upon a finding of fact that the former
husband is able to pay or that he willfully
refuses to comply with the order, and in the
absence of such finding,

the judgment is void.

DeYonge v. DeYonge, 103 Utah 410, 135 P.2d
905 (1943).

It was not within the discretion

of the trial court to commit appellant to jail
for contempt unless he secure a release of a
lien upon furniture in respondent's possession.
'rhere was no finding that the appellant was
able to pay, nor was there a finding that he
Willfully refused to pay.
such finding,

In the absence of

the judgment of contempt is void,
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and the trial court cannot "allow" appellant
to purge himself of a void contempt charge.
It is clear from the record that appellant
was not able to meet his payments, but that
he made every reasonable effort to pay what

he could (T. 17, 18-26).
Furthermore, the trial court's order
that he secure a release or be found in contempt,

in effect, rendered the bankruptcy

decree void.

The obligation on the furniture

had been discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding four months before the divorce decree
had been entered.

The trial court cannot now

order a debt to be paid which has been legally
discharged.

This argument is further empha-

sized in Point IV.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF THE
DIVORCE DECREE TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY
AND CHILD SUPPORT PAYABLE BY THE APPELLANT
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THE RESPOI\TDENT.
THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE POINT AT ISSUE.

TO

Utah law allows the court, or petition
by the parties,

to change the amount of alimony

and child support from time to time.
When a decree of divorce is made,
the court may make such orders
in relation to the children, property, and parties, and the maintenance of the parties and children,
be equitable,
.Such
subsequent changes or new orders
may be made by the court with
respect to the disposal of the
children or the distribution of
property as shall be reasonable
and proper. Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5 (1953).
(emphasis added).
This statute, which makes the determination for modification an equitable proceeding,
has been construed ".

.to empower the court

to make a modification where there has been
substantial change in the material circumstRnccs of either one or both of the parties
since the decree was entered."

Sorensen v.

20 Utah 2d 360, 361, 438 P.2d 180,

18

181 (1968).

Further,

it must be shown that

the husband has not caused or contributed
to the

11

•

•

•

existence of the grounds for

which modification is sought.

11

Ibid.

Appellant has met his burden of showing
substantial change both on his part and on
the part of his wife.
changes.

He has not caused the

Since the divorce decree,

the

appellant's take-home pay has dropped from
$650.00 per month to $500.00 per month (T.
30, 49).

This has come about through no

fault of his own.
Q.
{by Mr. Peterson)
Are
you telling us now you will
earn less money this year
than you did last year?
A.
I am earning less money
this year than last year.
Q.

Why is that?

A. Circumstances beyond my
control.
I don't know why it
is.
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Q. What are those circumstances?
A.
I don't get called out
to work as often as I used
to.
I don't know what their
changes have been or business
conditions or what, but I am
not just making the money this
year that I did last year at
this time (T. 46).
Furthermore,

the respondent's earnings

have increased from zero to $199.80 per

month,

take-home pay,

through no fault of

appellant's (T. 52).

In Sorensen, Supra,

the court said that the fact

the
- .

wife owned
.

-

property which had increased in value after

the alimony decree was an important consideration for determining changed conditions.
19_. at 361, 438 P.2d at

By analogy,

the fact that the wife's income has increased
is also substantial evidence

natural circumstances.
shown in the record.

of

change in

This ground is clearly

(T. 52)
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The change sought by the appellant is
both reasonable and proper in light of the
changed conditions.

Since the hearing on

the petition for modification of alimony and
child support is an equitable proceeding,
the court should closely scrutinize the
situation and apply equitable remedies.
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 20 Utah 2d at 361, 438
P.2d at 180.

The appellant, after deducting

his expenses, has $76.00 left with which to
pay the decreed amount of $280.00 (T. 18-28,
49) .

He has requested the court to lower the

child support from $180.00 a month to $150.00,
and to relieve him from any alimony.

This is

reasonable in light of the facts that (1)
since the time the decree was entered, the
appellant has taken a $150.00 deduction per
month in take-home pay, and (2) the respondent
now earns almost $200.00 per month.

At the
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time of the decree, she was earning zero
(T.

52) .

There is evidence that the appel-

lant has had to borrow money to pay the
support (T. 22).

The appellant has made

every reasonable effort to pay the support
and wishes to continue to pay what he can.
If he is required to continue to pay the
$280.00, eventually the respondent may not
get any support because appellant could very
well lose his job because of the garnishment

(T. 55), and may not be able to borrow anymore money.

Equity demands that the respon-

dent should receive support.

But equity al'so

demands that the appellant should not be
forced to go further in debt to meet his
obligations.
The circumstances of both parties have
changed, and they have changed beyond appellant 1 s control.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
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(1953) permits subsequent changes from th2
clivorce decree which are reasonable and proper.
Based upon the foregoing,

it is evident that

the trial court erred in denying appellant's

application for modification of the divorce
decree to reduce ·the amount payable as alimony
and child support.
-POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF
DIVORCE DECREE TO RELIEVE HIM OF THE OBLIGATION TO PAY THE PARTIES 1 DEBTS.
Inherent in this argument is the question
of whether the divorce court can,

after bank-

ruptcy, hold the wife harmless from liability
of the parties'

bankruptcy.

debts incurred before the

The appellant admits that alimony

and child support are not dischargeable debts
Under a bankruptcy decree.

11 U.S.C.A. § 35.

It is also not contended that any debts
incurred after the bankruptcy are discharged,
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and the court is within its power to hold
the wife harmless for such debts.

However,

where the husband has been decreed bankrupt
prior to his divorce, the divorce court
cannot reinstate his obligations which have
already been discharged by the bankruptcy
referee.

"A discharge in bankruptcy shall

release a bankrupt from all his provable
debts.

II

11 U.S.C.A. § 35.

The appellant

was adjudged bankrupt on August 5, 1968.

On

October 21, 1968, the Utah County District
Court entered its decree of divorce.
the alimony and child support,

Besides

the court

ordered the appellant to hold the respondent
harmless from liability of all the debts of
llie parties.

This decree in effect renders

the bankruptcy null and void as to those

debts discharged by the referee.
There are cases holding that the bankruptcy does not discharge obligations
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relating to the wife's maintenance and
support,

i.e., liabilities incurred by the

husbund and wife.

Erickson v. Beardall,

20 Utah 2d 287, 437 P.2d 210

(1968) i In

Re Baldwin, 250 F. Supp. 533 (1966).
in these cases,

However,

the bankruptcy was effected

after the divorce decree.

The petitions

were for review of the bankruptcy proceedings.
Here, the bankruptcy occurred before the divorce
decree, and there is no dispute that the bankruptcy referee rightfully discharged the
obligations.
The decree should have been modified
to exclude the order to hold the respondent
harmless.

The trial court erred in denying

the appellant's petition for modification
of said order.
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CONCLUSION
The District Court's order holding the
appellant in contempt should be reversed.
The appellant requests the following be
granted:

(1)

that his child support pay-

rnents be lowered to $150.00 per month;

(2)

that he be relieved of any obligation to pay
alimony;

(3)

that he be relieved of the

obligation to pay the parties' debts.
Respectfully submitted,

z;.CZ:#/

LAVOY O. TAYLOR
Attorney at Law
3069 South 2910 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Appellant

